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Abstract
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey auction produces efficient, core out-
comes that yield competitive seller revenues. In contrast, with complements, the
Vickrey outcome, while efficient, is not necessarily in the core and revenue can be
very low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders will-
ing to pay more than the winners’ payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render
the auction vulnerable to defections as the seller can attract better offers afterwards.
To avoid instabilities of this type, Day and Raghavan (2007) and Day and Milgrom
(2007) have suggested to adapt the Vickrey pricing rule. For a simple environment
with private information, we show that the resulting auction format yields lower
than Vickrey revenues and inefficient outcomes that are on average further from the
core than Vickrey outcomes. More generally, we prove that the Vickrey auction is
the unique core-selecting auction. Hence, when the Vickrey outcome is not in the
core, no Bayesian incentive-compatible core-selecting auction exists. Our results
further imply that the competitive equilibrium cannot be implemented when goods
are not substitutes. Moreover, even with substitutes, the competitive equilibrium
can only be implemented when it coincides with the Vickrey outcome.
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1. Introduction
Practical auction design is often complicated by institutional details and legal or po-
litical constraints. For example, using bidder-specific bidding credits or reserve prices
may be considered discriminatory and unlawful in some countries making it impossible to
implement an optimal auction design. More generally, the use of sizeable reserve prices
may cause political stress due to the fear that it slows down technological progress when
licenses remain unsold. While constraints of this nature are common and important in
practice, mechanism design theory has typically treated them as secondary to incentive
constraints.
Recent work by Day and Raghavan (2007), Day and Milgrom (2008), and Day and
Cramton (2008) breaks with this tradition and asks how close incentive constraints can
be approximated if other (institutional or political) constraints are imposed first. In
particular, these authors have proposed an alternative payment rule to fix some drawbacks
of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, or “Vickrey auction” for short. The
Vickrey auction produces core outcomes that yield competitive seller revenues when goods
are substitutes. However, when goods are complements, the Vickrey outcome, while
efficient, is not necessarily in the core and seller revenue can be very low as a result.
Non-core outcomes are “unfair” in that there are bidders willing to pay more than the
winners’ payments, which makes the auction vulnerable to defections as the seller can
attract better offers afterwards. The low revenue, perceived unfairness, and instability of
Vickrey outcomes can create legal and political problems, which the alternative payment
rule seeks to avoid.
BCV payments1 are such that (i) given reported bids, no group of bidders can block the
outcome, (ii) bidders’ profits are maximized, and (iii) payments are as close as possible
to the original Vickrey payments. These properties ensure that the payments are (i)
considered “fair,” (ii) minimize the maximum possible gains from deviating from truthful
bidding, and (iii) are unique. The requirement that payments are as close of possible
to the original Vickrey payments furthermore reinforces the idea that the distortion of
incentives is as small as possible.2
1BCV stands for bidder-optimal, “core-selecting,” Vickrey-nearest. Here “core selecting” reflects the
property that no coalition of bidders can block the outcome based on reported bids. It does not imply
that BCV payments produce core outcomes (with respect to bidders’ preferences) unless reported bids
are always truthful. Below we show that this is not the case.
2It is important to point out that bidders’ maximal incentives for (possibly large) deviations are
1
The introduction of BCV prices comes at the expense of (computational) complexity.
When there are W winning bidders the number of non-blocking constraints to be verified
can be as large as 2W−1. And the checking of each constraint involves solving an NP-hard
winner-determination problem. Day and Raghavan (2007) propose an ingenious algorithm
in which constraints are generated “on the fly,” i.e only the maximally-violated constraint
is generated, which can greatly reduce the number of constraint checks. Nevertheless, one
worries about the feasibility of finding BCV prices in applications with a sizeable number
of bidders and items, especially in the “worst case” when many constraints are violated.
On a positive note, an algorithm to find BCV prices will not “search in vain” (because
such prices do exist3) nor will it produce “ambiguous” answers (because such prices are
unique) – it may just take a long time.
Computational complexity issues are not the topic of this paper. Rather we study
how well incentive constraints are “approximated” in the BCV auction. For complete-
information environments it has been shown that the BCV auction yields the Vickrey
outcome when it is in the core and results in higher seller revenues when it is not. More-
over, the BCV auction minimizes the maximal gain from deviating from truthful bidding
(e.g. Day and Milgrom, 2007). These positive results, however, rely crucially on the
assumption that bidders’ values and, hence, their bids are commonly known. In most
practical applications, bidders’ values constitute proprietary information.
We first consider a simple incomplete-information environment where two local bidders
interested in single items compete with a global bidder interested in the package. Bidders’
values are privately known and uniformly distributed. We show that the BCV auction
results in lower than Vickrey revenues and in inefficient outcomes that are on average
further from the core than Vickrey outcomes. The reason for these negative results is
that bidders no longer have a dominant strategy to bid truthfully. Indeed, we prove that
bid shading is a “dominant property,” i.e. even if others bid truthfully it is better to
shade one’s bid.
The natural follow-up question is whether there is any Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanism that can guarantee core outcomes, and we show that the answer is negative.4
minimized. Erdil and Klemperer (2009) show that bidders always have marginal incentives to deviate
from truthful bidding, and they propose the introduction of reference prices to reduce bidders’ incentives
for such marginal deviations.
3E.g. winning bidders paying their bids constitutes an outcome that cannot be blocked.
4Throughout we focus on Bayesian incentive compatibility rather than on the stronger notion of ex
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We first prove that any core-selecting auction must be equivalent to the Vickrey auction
in the sense that, for every possible valuation profile, the seller’s revenue and bidders’
profits are ex post identical. For the case of substitutes it is well known that the Vickrey
outcome is in the core, and our results imply that the revenue from any core-selecting
mechanism equals the Vickrey revenue in this case. But when the Vickrey outcome is not
in the core, our results imply there exists no Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism
that produces core outcomes. The intuition is that bidders’ information rents preclude
higher than Vickrey revenues and when the Vickrey revenue is so low that the outcome
is not in the core, no core-selecting auction exists.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the bidding environ-
ment and explains the construction of BCV prices. In Section 3 we analyze the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of the BCV auction and evaluate its performance in terms of revenue and ef-
ficiency. In Section 4 we prove that core-selecting auctions are generally not possible.
Section 5 concludes.
2. BCV Prices: An Example
Consider an environment with two local bidders and a single global bidder who com-
pete for two items labeled A and B. Local bidder 1 (2) is interested only in acquiring
item A (B), for which she has value v1 (v2). The global bidder is interested only in the
package AB consisting of both items, for which she has value V .
In the Vickrey auction, bidders simply bid their values for the object they are interested
in: bi(vi) = vi and B(V ) = V . This yields a fully efficient outcome, i.e. the global bidder
wins all items iff B >
∑n
i=1 bi, or equivalently, iff V >
∑n
i=1 vi. While the Vickrey auction
generates full efficiency, it is well known that it may result in low revenues when the
outcome is not in the core (e.g. Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006).
Lemma 1. In the Vickrey auction, the outcome is always in the core when the global
bidder wins but the outcome is never in the core when the local bidders win.
post incentive compatibility, which requires dominant strategies. The Green and Laffont (1977) and
Holmstrom (1979) theorem derives conditions under which the Vickrey auction is the unique efficient,
ex post incentive compatible mechanism. For the weaker notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility, the
Vickrey auction is no longer the unique efficient mechanism. For example, in the single unit case with
symmetric bidders, the first-price auction, all-pay auction, etc., are all Bayesian incentive compatible and
efficient.
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Proof. When the global bidder wins, she pays the sum of the local bidders’ bids so the
local bidders cannot form a blocking coalition. When the local bidders win, the Vickrey
payment for local bidder 1 is pV1 ≡ max(0, B − b2), i.e. the negative externality local
bidder 1 poses on others, which is zero if the other local bidder wins even without local
bidder 1. Similarly, pV2 ≡ max(0, B − b1). When either b1 > B or b2 > B, or both, then
the sum of payments is obviously less than the global bidder’s B, and when both b1 < B
and b2 < B but b1+b2 > B, the sum of the payments is 2B−(b1+b2) < B. To summarize,
when the local bidders win the outcome is not in the core because the coalition of the
global bidder and the seller can block the outcome. Q.E.D.
When the local bidders win the auction the total sales price is less than the global bidder’s
bid. To remedy this flaw, various authors including Day and Raghavan (2007), Day and
Milgrom (2008), and Day and Cramton (2008) have proposed to adjust Vickrey payments
so that the outcome cannot be blocked by any coalition. In particular, in the BCV auction,
winning local bidders’ payments are adjusted so that they add up to exactly B and are
as close as possible to Vickrey payments.5
The construction of BCV prices is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of two local
bidders with bids of 8 for the single items and one global bidder with a bid of 10 for the
package. The local bidders win and each pays the opportunity cost of 10−8 = 2, as shown
by the Vickrey point labeled “(2, 2)” in Figure 1. The set of prices that correspond to
allocations that cannot be blocked are indicated by the shaded area. This area is bounded
by the constraints pA ≤ 8 and pB ≤ 8 since local bidders cannot be made to pay more
than their bids, and pA+pB ≥ 10 to ensure that the losing global bidder and seller cannot
form a blocking coalition. In particular, in the BCV auction, the winning local bidders’
payments are chosen such they add up to exactly the global bidder’s losing bid of 10. In
Figure 1, this is indicated by the thick line: any point on this line minimizes the sum of
local bidders’ payments subject to the constraint that the outcome cannot be blocked.
5In other words, local bidder i’s payment is perturbed, pi = pVi + εi, where the εi ≥ 0 follow from the
quadratic programming problem:
min (ε21 + ε
2
2) s.t. ε1 + ε2 = B − pV1 − pV2
For our setup, the solution is simply ε1 = ε1 = (B− pV1 − pV2 )/2, so that p1+ p2 = B and the outcome is
in the core with respect to reported bids. It is interesting to note the similarity with the RAD mechanism
proposed by Kwasnica et al. (2005) where linear prices are perturbed to satisfy competitive-equilibrium
constraints, rather then core constraints.
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Figure 1. Constructing BCV prices, (5, 5), from Vickrey prices (2, 2). Pay-your-bid prices
correspond to (8, 8).
The final step is to generate a unique answer, which is accomplished by finding the unique
point on the thick line that is closest to the original Vickrey prices (2, 2), i.e. the point
(pA, pB) that minimizes the Euclidean distance ((pA−2)2+(pB−2)2)1/2. In the example,
this yields the point labeled “(5, 5)” in Figure 1. Finally, pay-your-bid prices are shown
by the point labeled “(8, 8).”
Note that the above construction subsumes that the profile of bids is fixed (i.e. bids
are treated as “exogenous data”) without addressing how changes in the payment rule
may affect submitted bids. This approach would be valid in a complete-information
framework where bidders’ values, and, hence, their bids, are common knowledge. But in
most applications, bidders’ values constitute proprietary information.
3. A Bayesian Analysis
In the Vickrey auction, bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their values. Fur-
thermore, when the global bidder wins, the outcome is always in the core with respect to
submitted bids (see Lemma 1) so there are no adjustments to the global bidder’s payment
in the BCV auction. As a result, the global bidder’s strategy is unaffected, i.e. truthful
bidding remains optimal. For the local bidders truthful bidding is no longer optimal,
however, since their own bids affect their payments.
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The next proposition shows the degree to which local bidders “shade” their bids in
response to the change in payment rule. For ease of exposition, we assume that all
distributions are uniform, leaving the general case for the next section. In particular, the
local bidders’ values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and the global bidder’s value for
the package is uniformly distributed on [0, 2].
Proposition 1. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the BCV auction is given by B(V ) = V
and
b(v) = max(0, v − α) (3.1)
where α = 1
2
E(b(v)) = 3− 2√2.
Proof. Local bidder 1’s optimal bid, b(v1), can be determined from the requirement that
the cost and benefit of a marginal deviation cancel. Suppose local bidder 1 with value v1
acts as if her type is v1 + ², i.e. she deviates to a bid of b(v1) + ²b
′(v1). The expected
gain of this deviation occurs when it turns the local bidder from a loser to a winner,
i.e. when the global bidder’s value lies between b(v1) + b(v2) and b(v1) + b(v2) + ²b
′(v1).
Since the distribution of the global bidder’s value is uniform on [0, 2], this probability is
equal to 1
2
²b′(v1). Also note that since the global bidder’s bid and the sum of the local
bidders’ bids are equal (up to order ²) in this case, bidder 1’s Vickrey payment is simply
V − b(v2) = b(v1), i.e. her own bid. Hence, the expected gain of the deviation is
1
2
²(v1 − b(v1))b′(v1). (3.2)
To determine the expected cost of the deviation, note that local bidder 1’s payment in
the BCV auction is given by
p1 = max(0, B − b2) + 12
(
B −max(0, B − b1)−max(0, B − b2)
)
,
(and bidder 2’s payment is defined similarly). The only term affected by an increase in
bidder 1’s bid is the 1
2
max(0, B− b1) term. Hence, when bidder 1 raises her bid by ²b′(v1)
her payment goes up by 1
2
²b′(v1) if and only if the global bidder’s value is greater than
b(v1) and less than b(v1) + b(v2) (since otherwise the local bidders do not win). So the
expected cost of local bidder 1’s deviation is simply
1
2
²b′(v1)
∫ 1
0
∫ b(v1)+b(v2)
b(v1)
1
2
dV dv2 =
1
4
²b′(v1)E(b(v)). (3.3)
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The requirement that the expected gain (3.2) cancels the expected cost (3.3) yields the
following first-order condition for the local bidders’ optimal bids:
b′(v)
(
v − b(v)− 1
2
E(b(v))
)
= 0. (3.4)
The unique solution is b(v) = max(0, v − α) where α ≡ 1
2
E(b(v)) follows from the fixed-
point condition
α = 1
2
∫ 1
α
(v − α)dv,
which yields α = 3− 2√2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that the introduction of BCV prices creates incentives for local bidders
to “free ride,” i.e. each local bidder wants to win but prefers other local bidders to bid
high. The consequences for the auction’s performance are easy to calculate.
Corollary 1. Compared to the Vickrey auction, the BCV auction reduces efficiency,
reduces revenue, and produces outcomes that are further away from the core.
Proof. A direct computation shows that the relative efficiency of the core-selecting
auction is: EBCV /EV = 98%, relative revenue is: RBCV /RV = 91%, and the relative
average Euclidean distance to the core is: dBCV /dV = 126%. Q.E.D.
The main insight of Proposition 1, i.e. that truthful bidding is not an equilibrium in the
BCV auction, holds under more general conditions.6 Importantly, the proof that bidders
should deviate from truthful bidding and shade their bids does not rely on an equilibrium
argument. The next proposition shows that bid shading is a “dominant property,” i.e.
even when others bid truthfully it is optimal to shade one’s bid.
Proposition 2. Suppose the other local bidder bids according to b(v) = max(0, v − αˆ)
and the global bidder bids according to B(V ) = V , then the best response is given by
b(v) = max
(
0, v − 1
4
(1− αˆ)2). (3.5)
6For general distributions of the local bidders’ values, F (v), the optimal bid function is given by
b(v) = max(0, v−α) where now α = 12
∫ 1
α
(v−α)dF (v). For some distributions, the resulting performance
measures of the BCV auction are worse than those of Corollary 1. Likewise, the assumption that the
global bidder’s value is uniformly distributed can be relaxed. The resulting bidding function for the local
bidders is no longer linear but free riding still occurs.
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In other words, bidders should (maximally) shade their bids more if others bid truthfully.
Proof. A direct computation shows that a local bidder’s expected payoff is
pi(v, b) =
1
2
(
v − 1
2
b
)(
b+
1
2
(1− αˆ)2)
when the other local bidder bids according to b(v) = max(0, v− αˆ) and the global bidder
bids according to B(V ) = V . Maximizing with respect to b yields (3.5). Q.E.D.
The fact that the BCV auction does not produce core outcomes with respect to bidders’
preferences, raises the question whether there is some other mechanism that can achieve
core outcomes. We next prove that the answer is negative.
4. An Impossibility Result
To glean some intuition, we first continue the above example with two local bidders and
a global bidder with uniform valuations and then generalize to arbitrary environments.
Since core allocations are efficient, the total surplus of a core allocation is given by
W (v1, v2, V ) = max
(
v1 + v2, V ),
which is divided in seller revenue, R, local bidders’ profits, pii, and the global bidder’s
profit, Π:
W (v1, v2, V ) = R(v1, v2, V ) + pi1(v1, v2, V ) + pi2(v1, v2, V ) + Π(v1, v2, V ).
The constraint that the allocation is in the core implies that
R(v1, v2, V ) ≥ min
(
v1 + v2, V ),
and, using |x− y| = max(x, y)−min(x, y), we get the inequality
|v1 + v2 − V | ≥ pi1(v1, v2, V ) + pi2(v1, v2, V ) + Π(v1, v2, V ).
8
In particular, by taking an expectation over bidders’ values we obtain the following nec-
essary condition for core allocations
∫ 2
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
|v1 + v2 − V |dv1dv21
2
dV ≥ 2
∫ 1
0
pi(v)dv +
∫ 2
0
Π(V )
1
2
dV (4.1)
where pi(v) and Π(V ) denote the expected profits of a local and global bidder respectively.
Using a standard envelope-theory argument, these expected profits can be calculated as
pi(v) =
∫ v
0
∫ 2
0
∫ 1
0
1V≤t+w dw
1
2
dV dt =
1
4
(
v + v2
)
and
Π(V ) =
∫ V
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1T>v+w dvdwdT =
{
1
6
V 3 0 ≤ V ≤ 1
1
6
(2− 6V + 6V 2 − V 3) 1 ≤ V ≤ 2
where we used that any core-selecting auction is efficient and that bidders’ with the lowest
possible values (of zero) have zero expected profits. It is straightforward to compare the
left-side of (4.1), which equals 7/12, to the bidders ex ante expected profits on the right
side, which equal 5/24 for each of the two local bidders and 7/24 for the global bidder.
Since 7/12 < 2·5/24+7/24 the necessary condition for core allocations in (4.1) is violated.
We next show how to generalize to arbitrary settings using the insights of the example.
Suppose there are N ≥ 1 bidders who are competing for M ≥ 1 goods. Bidder i’s private
information, or type, is denoted by ti, which is distributed according to Fi(·) with support
[ti, ti]. So bidders’ types are one-dimensional and independently distributed. Bidder i’s
private valuation for bundle x is given by vi(x, ti), which is continuously differentiable in
ti. We assume quasi-linear preferences, i.e. when bidder i wins bundle x and pays an
amount p, her profit is pii = vi(x, ti) − p. The seller’s profit, or revenue, is denoted R.
Finally, for any subset of bidders S ⊆ N we define the coalitional value
VS = max
x∈X
∑
i∈S
vi(x, ti) (4.2)
where X is the set of all feasible allocations. In words, VS is the maximum possible value
when the goods are allocated only to bidders in S.
9
First, consider the Vickrey auction, which is efficient so RV +
∑
i∈N pi
V
i = VN . Taking
expectations we have7∫ (
VN −RV
)
dF (t) =
∑
i∈N
∫
piVi dF (t) =
∑
i∈N
∫
(VN − VN\i)dF (t)
where we used piVi = vi − (VN\i − (VN − vi)), i.e. bidder i’s Vickrey payment is the
negative externality imposed on others. We assume that the Vickrey auction results in
zero expected profits for bidders with the lowest possible types, i.e. piV (ti) = 0 for all i.
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Myerson’s Lemma (see, for instance, Milgrom, 2004, p. 75) implies that bidders’
expected profits in any other efficient mechanism differ from Vickrey expected profits
only by a constant, i.e.
∑
i∈N
∫
piidF (t) =
∑
i∈N
pii(ti) +
∑
i∈N
∫
piVi dF (t) (4.3)
where individual rationality dictates that pii(ti) ≥ 0 for all i.9 Since any core-selecting
mechanism has to be efficient, we thus have∫ (
VN −R
)
dF (t) =
∑
i∈N
∫
piidF (t) =
∑
i∈N
∫
(VN − VN\i)dF (t) +
∑
i∈N
pii(ti) (4.4)
We will next combine equality (4.4) with a subset of all core constraints.
The core constraints involving a single bidder, without the seller, dictate that pii ≥ 0
for all i ∈ N , i.e. individual rationality is guaranteed by requiring core outcomes. More
generally, there are 2N − 1 core constraints that follow by considering all non-empty
subsets of bidders S ⊆ N and the seller:
R +
∑
i∈S
pii ≥ VS.
7Here
∫
dF (t) is short for
∫ t1
t1
· · · ∫ tN
tN
dF1(t1) · · · dFN (tN ).
8E.g., when the private values vi(·, ti) are zero.
9The assumptions required for Myerson’s Lemma to hold are that (i) bidders’ types are one-
dimensional, (ii) bidders’ types are independently distributed, (iii) preferences are quasi-linear, i.e.
pii = vi(x, t)− p where p is the price paid for bundle x, (iv) values are private, i.e. vi(x, t) = vi(x, ti) and
(v) vi(x, ti) is continuously differentiable in ti.
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We focus on |N | of the constraints, one for each bidder. In particular, for each i ∈ N , let
S = N\i in the previous inequality:
R +
∑
j∈N\i
pij ≥ VN\i (4.5)
Summing over all i ∈ N we have
N ·R + (N − 1)
∑
i∈N
pii ≥
∑
i∈N
VN\i
A core allocation is efficient, VN = R +
∑
i∈N pii, which together with the previous in-
equality yields:
VN −R ≤
∑
i∈N
(VN − VN\i) (4.6)
Now compare inequality (4.6), which stems from core constraints, with equality (4.4),
which results from incentive compatibility. Imposing individual rationality shows that
the only way in which both sets of conditions can be satisfied is that pi(ti) = 0 and
R = VN −
∑
i∈N
(VN − VN\i) = RV , (4.7)
i.e. the revenue of a core-selecting auction has to be equal to the Vickrey revenue for
every valuation profile (not just in expectation).
Since any core-selecting auction is efficient it also generates the same surplus as the
Vickrey auction. As a result, the sum of bidders’ profits has to equal the sum of bidders’
Vickrey profits. In fact, it is easy to show something stronger, namely that in any core-
selecting auction a bidder’s profit is equal to her Vickrey profit. Recall that for efficient
assignments we have
R +
∑
j∈N
pij = VN ,
which, together with (4.5), implies that
pii ≤ VN − VN\i = piVi
But from (4.3) and pii(ti) = 0 we conclude pii = pi
V
i , again for every valuation profile.
Defining two mechanisms as equivalent when they produce the same surplus, revenue,
11
and bidders’ profits for all possible type profiles, we have:
Proposition 3. Any core-selecting auction is equivalent to the Vickrey auction. Hence,
if the Vickrey outcome is not in the core, there exists no Bayesian incentive-compatible
core-selecting auction.
Our results differ from the Green and Laffont (1977) and Holmstrom (1979) theorem,
which establishes conditions under which the Vickrey auction is the unique efficient, ex
post incentive-compatible mechanism. We relax ex post incentive compatibility to mere
Bayesian incentive compatibility (i.e. we don’t require dominant strategies) and replace
the condition that losing bidders pay nothing with the requirement that the outcome must
be in the core – we show that the only possibility is the Vickrey outcome.10
When does the Vickrey auction result in a core outcome? Ausubel and Milgrom (2002,
Theorem 12) show that a necessary and sufficient condition is that goods are substitutes
(see also Gul and Stacchetti, 1999).11
Corollary 2. With four or more bidders, core-selecting auctions exist if and only if goods
are substitutes, in which case they are equivalent to the Vickrey auction.
To illustrate, consider a slight adaptation of the example of Section 3: two local bidders
have valuations vi that are uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the global bidder has a value
V for the package that is uniformly distributed on [0,2] and values for the individual items
equal to 1
2
(1−α)V , where −1 ≤ α ≤ 1. Note that the global bidder’s valuations are sub-
additive for α negative and super-additive for α positive. Consider valuation profiles for
which vi ≥ V , which have strictly positive measure, so that the local bidders win and
their Vickrey profits are piV1 = v1 − 12(1− α)V and piV2 = v2 − 12(1− α)V . Since welfare is
equal to v1 + v2, the seller’s revenue is
RV = (1− α)V.
Now consider the blocking coalition formed by the seller and the global bidder, which
10We also assume independence of types, which is obviously not required with ex post incentive com-
patibility.
11Following Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) it is assumed here that the set of valuation profiles contains
the set of additive value functions.
12
results in the constraint
RV ≥ V
i.e. the Vickrey auction results in core allocations only if α ≤ 0, i.e. when goods are
substitutes.
Finally, our results have implications for the implementability of competitive equilib-
rium outcomes. Since the Vickrey auction is the unique core-selecting auction, the only
point in the core that is implementable is the Vickrey outcome.
Corollary 3. When goods are substitutes, the competitive equilibrium outcome can be
implemented if and only if it coincides with the Vickrey outcome. When goods are not
substitutes, the competitive equilibrium outcome (if it exists) cannot be implemented.
For the substitutes case, it is well known that Vickrey prices may be less than competi-
tive equilibrium prices. To illustrate, suppose there are 2M items (with M ≥ 2) and two
bidders with valuation functions vi(m, ti) = v(m)ti for i = 1, 2, where the ti are indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed on [0,1] and v(m) is a concave function for 0 ≤ m ≤ 2M .
Consider type profiles for which the types are “close,” e.g. t1 = t(1 + ²) and t2 = t(1− ²)
with ² small. An efficient outcome dictates that both bidders get M units and the re-
sulting Vickrey payments are approximately (v(2M)− v(M))t for both bidders. In other
words, the Vickrey per-unit price is
pV =
v(2M)− v(M)
M
t.
A lower bound for the competitive equilibrium price, p, follows from the requirement that
at price p neither bidder desires an additional unit: v(M)t−Mp ≥ v(M +1)t− (M +1)p,
or
p ≥ v(M + 1)− v(M)
1
t,
which exceeds the Vickrey per-unit price by concavity of v(·). To summarize, for a positive
measure of types, the competitive equilibrium outcome differs from the Vickrey outcome,
and Corollary 3 implies that the competitive equilibrium outcome cannot be implemented.
This result has important implications for equilibrium behavior in commonly used
auction formats. For example, it implies that demand reduction has to occur in every
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equilibrium of the uniform-price and clock auctions. Likewise, it implies that straight-
forward bidding cannot be an equilibrium of the simultaneous ascending auction, since
straightforward bidding results in Walrasian prices.
5. Conclusion
The BCV auction has been shown to have some remarkable properties in complete-
information environments where bidders’ values and, hence, their bids are commonly
known (e.g. Day and Milgrom, 2007). In particular, when bids are completely predictable,
the introduction of BCV prices ensures outcomes that are “fair” and seller revenues that
are not embarrassingly low.
This paper considers the performance of the BCV auction for the realistic case when
bidders’ values are privately known and, hence, their bids are not perfectly predictable.
If in such incomplete-information environments truthful bidding would be optimal then
the BCV auction would reliably outperform the Vickrey auction. However, our analysis
shows that truthful bidding is not an equilibrium – bid shading is a “dominant property”
in that it is optimal even when others bid truthfully. We show that the BCV auction
may result in lower than Vickrey revenues and in inefficient outcomes that are on average
further from the core than Vickrey outcomes.
We study whether core-allocations can be achieved by any mechanism in a general
environment where goods can be substitutes and/or complements. We show that bidders’
Bayesian incentive-compatibility constraints impose an upper bound on expected revenue,
while (a subset of) the core constraints impose a lower bound on the ex post revenue. We
prove that only the Vickrey revenue satisfies both the lower and upper bounds. As a result,
the ex post surplus, seller’s revenue, and bidders’ profits in any core-selecting auction are
identical to their Vickrey counterparts, i.e. any core-selecting auction is equivalent to
the Vickrey auction. A fortiori, if the Vickrey outcome is outside the core, no Bayesian
incentive-compatible core-selecting auction exists.
Our impossibility result is akin to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) finding that
efficient bilateral trade is not generally possible. In both cases the intuition is that in-
centive compatibility requires that market participants have information rents (reflecting
their private information). In the two-sided setting studied by Myerson and Satterth-
waite, traders’ expected information rents may exceed the surplus generated by trade.
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In the one-sided setting studied here, bidders’ information rents imply an upper-bound
on the seller’s revenue – an upper-bound that generally conflicts with some of the core
constraints.
Core allocations are possible when all goods are substitutes. The interest in core-
selecting auctions, however, derives from environments in which the substitutes assump-
tion is relaxed. In this case, competitive equilibrium does not necessarily exist and “... the
conception of auctions as mechanisms to identify market clearing prices is fundamentally
misguided” (Milgrom, 2004, p. 296). The core, which always exist in these one-sided
applications, seems the natural and relevant solution concept since “... competitive equi-
librium outcomes are always core outcomes, so an outcome outside the core can be labeled
uncompetitive” (Milgrom, 2004, p. 303). Our results, however, demonstrate that with
incomplete information, core assignments are not generally possible unless all goods are
substitutes. More generally, our results underline the importance of putting incentive
constraints first, also in practical auction design.
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